Using a database that records the census of …rm-level trade by Chinese …rms, we provide systematic evidence that intermediaries play an important role in faciliating trade across borders. Intermediaries account for at least 20% of China's imports and exports in 2005. This implies that a large number of …rms are able to engage in international trade without directly exporting or importing products. We modify a heterogenous …rm trade model to allow …rms to endogenously select their mode of export-either directly or indirectly through an intemediary. The model predicts that intermediaries play a relatively more important role in markets that are more di¢ cult to penetrate. We provide empirical con…rmation for this prediction as well as generate new facts regarding the activity of intermediaries.
Introduction
Research using …rm-level data has uncovered that only a fraction of …rms export products to foreign markets. In the U.S., Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2009) report that only 35 and 25 percent of …rms in mining, agriculture and manufacturing sectors exported or imported at least one product in 2000. This fact, which has emerged across many countries, is now well-grounded in theoretical models featuring …rm heterogeneity and …xed export costs (e.g., Melitz 2003 and Bernard et al. 2003) . These empirical and theoretical …ndings, however, do not account for the role that intermediaries, wholesalers, and distributors play in facilitating international trade. The prominence of intermediaries appears in aggregate trade statistics; in the U.S., wholesale and retail …rms account for 21 and 30 percent of non-service related exports and imports (Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2009) .
The use of intermediary …rms has been even more pervasive in developing economies, particularly in Asia. In the early 1980s, 300 trading (non-manufacturing) Japanese …rms accounted for 80 percent of Japanese trade, and the ten largest of these …rms accounted for 30 percent of Japan's GNP (Rossman, 1984) . During the early 1950s in China, only six …rms engaged in international trade on behalf of domestic …rms; by the time China embarked on market reforms in 1978, all international trade ‡owed through just sixteen trading …rms (Lardy, 1993) . 1 In China today, the setting of our study, our data indicate that at least 22 and 18 percent of total Chinese exports and imports ‡ows through non-manufacturing …rms.
The importance of intermediary …rms in facilitating Chinese trade across borders indicates that existing models should be augmented to provide a more complete portrait of a country's imports and exports. In this paper, we introduce intermediation technology within a heterogenous …rm model of international trade. As in Melitz (2003) , …rms can directly export to foreign markets buy incurring …xed costs of exports and trade costs. This implies that the least productive …rms serve only the domestic market while the most productive …rms directly export their varieties by paying a …xed export cost. We introduce an intermediation technology whereby …rms can indirectly export their varieties by paying both an intermediary …xed cost, which is smaller than the …xed cost of direct exports, and an additional marginal cost. The introduction of this new entry margin creates a third type of …rm: an indirect exporter. Firms at an intermediate level of productivity can incur the intermediation costs to forward their products to an intermediary who exports on their behalf. The presence of intermediary …rms therefore provides a mechanism by which …rms can access the export market even if they are not quite productive enough to set up their own distribution network.
The model predicts that the share of exports handled by intermediary …rms increases in both the variable and …xed costs of exporting. The reason is that as trade becomes more costly, …rms need to possess high levels of productivity to overcome these costs to directly export. When barriers to trade are larger, a greater fraction of relatively less-productive domestic …rms forward their varieties to the intermediary …rms to export on their behalf. We therefore expect to observe the share of a total exports to a country facilitated by Chinese intermediaries to be increasing in the degree of di¢ culty in penetrating the market.
The model therefore predicts that less-productive …rms are able to access foreign markets by relying on intermediary …rms. This prediction is consistent with observations from the business literature (e.g., Peng and Ilinitch, 1998) and underpins government policy, such as the 1982 U.S. Export Trading Company Act, which explicitly encourages the formation of intermediary …rms to export on behalf of the "tens of thousands"of small-and medium-sized U.S. businesses (Export Trading Company Act of 1982) . The model also formalizes the wellknown observation that intermediary trading companies have long played an important role in global trade. Grief (1993) documents the importance of the Maghribi traders coalition in establish trade across long distances during the 11th century. Other prominent trading companies throughout history include the Dutch East India Trading Company, large-scale Japanese trading …rms (sogo shosha), and more recently, Li and Fung, the Hong Kong textile and apparel …rm.
We verify the predictions of the model using a recently constructed database of …rm-level Chinese international trade transactions. The data reveal many interesting stylized facts about Chinese intermediary …rms and consequently, China's overall trade patterns. In 2005, Chinese intermediaries accounted for 22 and 18 percent of total exports and imports. Between 2000 and 2005, the number of intermediaries increased dramatically from about 9,000 to 22,000, suggesting that while the Chinese government relaxed the restrictions on direct trading right during this period (see discussion below), intermediaries still found it pro…table to enter the trading market. Intermediary …rms are also more likely to engage in importing and exporting and in stark contrast to direct exporters, their product mix span remarkably broad sectors. Interestingly, intermediary …rms appear to have a relative "country" focus while …rms that engage in direct exporting appear to have a relative "product" focus. That is, intermediary …rms send relatively more products per country while direct exporters export to more countries per product. This …nding is intuitive; manufacturing …rms likely possess a core competent product line (Bernard, Redding and Schott, 2009) , while in our model, intermediaries emerge precisely to overcome the …xed costs of market access.
The data are consistent with several predictions from the model; more distant, smaller countries, and countries that have more regulatory barriers to trade receive a larger fraction of exports through Chinese intermediaries. Intermediary …rms play a relatively smaller role in exporting to countries that have large Chinese-speaking population which is intuitive if common language represents a measure of …xed exporting costs. Finally, intermediary …rms'export share increases with countries that levy higher tari¤s on Chinese exports. Our point estimates imply that increasing a country's distance to China by one log point would increase the share of exports handled by intermediaries to that country by about 10 percent. Likewise, an increase in tari¤s by 10 percentage points (roughly one standard deviation in our sample) is associated with a 15 percent increase in intermediary export shares.
Our theoretical and empirical …ndings o¤er another channel for why intermediaries arise in cross-border trade. Previous work has focused on the role of intermediaries in matching buyers and sellers by either reducing search costs (e.g., Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1987) or adverse selection costs by acting as gauranteers of quality (see Biglaiser (1993) and Spulber (1996) ). 2 In a study of Hong Kong's entrepôt trade, consistent with the quality-sorting role of intermediaries, Feenstra and Hanson (2004) …nd that between 1988-1993, 53 percent of China's exports were shipped through Hong Kong, and the average markup of Hong Kong re-exports of Chinese goods was 24 percent. They …nd that Hong Kong intermediaries possess an informational advantage and therefore serve as well-placed brokers that aid the matching of Chinese suppliers with foreign buyers. The role of intermediaries in reducing search costs has also been explored by Rauch and Trindade (2002) who …nd that ethnic Chinese networks have a sizable impact on bilateral trade ‡ows. More recent work by Blum, Claro, and Horstmann (2009) provides evidence that in the majority of importerexporter matches between Colombian and Chilean …rms, at least one …rm is extremely large due to search costs. Rauch and Watson (2004) and Felbermayr and Jung (2008) focus on holdup problems that may arise between intermediaries and manufacturers. Our theoretical framework is closest to Felbermayr and Jung (2008) who also derive a sorting equilibrium with less productive …rms choosing to export via intermediaries. However, their model focuses on potential holdup problems between intermediaries and manufactures and generates the prediction that intermediary shares are independent of market size, distance and variable and …xed export costs; these predictions are inconsistent with the data.
Moreover, the existing empirical work analyzing intermediary …rms rely on product or industry-level data in their analysis. One exception is a Blum et al. (2009) who can observe matches between importers and exporters but do not identify if either party within the match are non-manufacturing intermediaries. Their analysis is also restricted to ChileanColombian trading partners. Here, we provide the …rst systematic evidence of the characteristics of intermediary …rms and their overall importance in international trade for the third largest exporting economy, China, because we can directly observe the universe of transactions by intermediary and direct exporters. We are therefore able to analyze the sources of variation in intermediary trade across products and markets.
The remaining paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we lay out the basic model and the predictions that we will very in the data. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents stylized facts of intermediary …rms and veri…es the predictions from the model. We conclude in section 5.
A Model of Intermediary Firms
We introduce a heterogenous …rm model that features intermediation technology. We assume that the home country has N asymmetric trading partners, and we focus on an open economy equilibrium because in autarky there is no role for intermediaries to export. 3 Consumers in each country have identical CES preferences for di¤erentiated varieties:
where j is the set of total available varieties in the di¤erentiated goods sector. The corresponding price index in each country is given by:
> 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution across varieties. Each consumer supplies one unit of labor inelastically and the home wage is set to 1. Total expenditure in each country is R j .
The production technology assumes a continuum of …rms in a monopolistically competitive market. Each …rm manufactures a unit variety with constant marginal cost and a …xed per period overhead cost, f d . Following Melitz (2003) , …rms are heterogeneous in productivity. The amount of labor required to produce q units for a …rm with productivity level ' is
Firms enter the market by paying an entry cost, f e , to draw their productivity from the distribution g('). Conditional on its productivity draw ', a …rm has the option to exit the market. Incumbent …rms face an exogenous probability of death, , in each period. Conditional on remaining in the market, a …rm must decide whether or not to export and additionally, its mode of export. There are two possible export modes; a …rm can export its varieties to foreign markets either directly or indirectly. As in Melitz (2003) , a …rm that exports directly pays a per period bilateral …xed cost, f j x and incurs a standard bilateral iceberg transportation costs j > 1. The …xed cost captures the costs of forming a distribution and service network in country j. Alternatively, a …rm could incur an alternative pair of transactions costs to export its varieties indirectly using a domestic intermediary …rm. We assume that the …xed costs of using this intermediation technology are lower than the exporting …xed costs, f i < f j x , since presumably the costs of searching for a domestic …rm are lower than the costs of an international search. The …rm also incurs a variable cost > 1 to forward its varieties to the intermediary …rm. The indirect …xed and variable costs are home-country speci…c because they re ‡ect the costs of …nding and using an intermediary …rm in the home country. One could interpret the …xed cost of intermediation (f i ) as the cost of searching and establishing a relationship with a domestic intermediary …rm. One interpretation of the variable cost ( ) is that it captures intermediary …rms'margins. 4 Given our assumptions on consumer preferences and market structure, prices are a constant markup over marginal costs. A …rm with productivity ' in the home market charges p d (') = Firm revenues in the domestic market are given by
where R H and P H are the home country's expenditure and price index. Additionally, if …rms export, their revenues depend on their export mode. The revenues obtained from market j for indirect and direct export mode, respectively, are:
and
The entry costs for each export mode and the revenue conditions in equation (1)-(3) yield cuto¤ conditions that induce sorting by …rms according to their productivity. The …rst cuto¤ (' d ) de…nes the least productive …rm that is active; this …rm only sells to the home country and exactly o¤sets the …xed costs of production with its operating pro…ts:
The second cuto¤ (' i ) is the marginal …rm that is just indi¤erent between exporting indirectly its varieties to all markets.
Equation (5) indicates that there is one cuto¤ in the home country that determines whether or not …rms indirectly export to all markets. All …rms with ' > ' i …nd it pro…table to incur the indirect …xed cost and potentially use the intermediation technology. Once the indirect …xed cost has been paid, a …rm then evaluates its net pro…ts (operating pro…ts less …xed direct export costs) from directly exporting to market j against the operating pro…ts from indirectly exporting to j. If the net pro…ts from direct export are su¢ ciently large, the …rm chooses to export directly to market j, rather than use the intermediation technology to avoid double marginalization. Thus, if a …rm directly exports to n countries, we assume that the …rm …nds it pro…table to pay the indirect …xed cost to serve the remaining N n countries through the intermediation technology. This assumption enables us to derive a tractable expression for the total direct and indirect exports to each market. There are N cuto¤ conditions that determine the …rms that are indi¤erent between direct and indirect exports to each market.
The three entry margins result in a sorting of …rms into export modes by productivity. Firms with ' < ' i are not productive enough to cover the …xed cost of intermediation; these …rms serve only the domestic market. All …rms that fall in the interval [' i ; ' Combining equation (3) with (6) determines the direct export cuto¤ to market j:
Since the indirect export cuto¤, ' i , which is implicitly de…ned in equation (5) is common across destination markets, we can de…ne the ratio of indirect to direct exports to country j as:
where
Proposition 1 Assume that the home country is small and does not a¤ ect the aggregate price index P j . All else equal, the share of exports via the intermediation technology will be larger in countries with (i) smaller market size, (ii) higher variable trade costs, or (iii) higher …xed costs of exporting.
Proof. Di¤erentiating equation (7), we get (i) @'
Since ' i is common for all trading partners and because Z 0 (a) < 0, we observe
The proposition states that the share of intermediary exports to market j are related to market j's characteristics. 5 We …nd that intermediary export shares will be larger in (i) smaller countries, (ii) countries that are geographically farther away from the home country, (iii) markets with higher tari¤s, or (iv) countries with larger …xed export costs. 6 These predictions are intuitive. Unlike Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) who introduce foreign direct investment within a heterogeneous …rm framework and …nd that the most productive …rms choose this mode of "selling abroad", in our model, intermediation technology bene…t the relatively less productive …rms by providing access to export markets. Our model highlights that intermediaries facilitate trade because they avoid large trade costs. This provides an alternative explanation for the endogenous formation of intermediaries beyond those noted in prior work, such as adverse selection, hold up, and search costs. Bernard et al. (2007) document that only a small fraction of U.S. …rms export, a fact that has emerged across countries. Our model also demonstrates that customs-level data are likely to underestimate the fraction of …rms that are globally engaged because less productive …rms can use intermediary …rms. For instance, Li and Fung, the large Hong-Kong based intermediary …rm aggregates orders across 12,000 suppliers across the globe, including China; it is likely that many of these …rms would be unable to recover the …xed costs of setting up their own distribution center. Our model suggests that intermediaries become relatively more important as markets become more di¢ cult to penetrate. The remainder of the paper will use data to verify the predictions of this model as well as generate previously unknown facts regarding the activity of intermediary …rms using customs data from China.
Before turning to the data, we note that we analyze the welfare in this model with intermediaries in the appendix by assuming a symmetric, two-country, and pareto distribution. We demonstrate that there is a tradeo¤ in the intermediary model with varieties and e¢ ciency. As the marginal cost of using intermediation technology ( ) declines, there is a less e¢ cient allocation of resources because intermediation bene…ts …rms of intermediate productivity. However, this is counterweighed against the increase in welfare because of the additional varieties that enter consumers'consumption basket.
Data
Our data analysis uses Chinese data that record the census of …rm-level import and export transactions across products and countries. 7 Products are classi…ed at the eightdigit HS level. We observe values and quantities for each …rm-product-market transaction. The data do not contain information about domestic production or characteristics of the …rms and so we cannot assign a primary industry to identify if the …rm is a manufacturer or a wholesaler, distributer and/or intermediary. We therefore identify the set of intermediary …rms based on Chinese characters that have the English-equivalent meaning of "importer", "exporter", and/or "trading" in the …rm's name. 8 This assignment is of course imperfect, but we believe that we will underestimate the importance of intermediaries in operating in China for two reasons. First, intermediaries could have names that do not have these phrases in their names. Second, the direct exporters may rely on foreign intermediary partners in their transactions (e.g., see Feenstra and Hanson (2004) ) who we cannot observe.
One issue that complicates our analysis is that the Chinese government directly controlled the set of …rms with direct trading rights prior to China's entry into the WTO in December 2001. The WTO mandated that China liberalize the scope and availability of licenses so that within three years after accession, all enterprises would have the right to import and export all goods. At the time of the WTO entry, only wholly Chinese-invested …rms with registered capital exceeding RMB 5 million could obtain direct trading rights. In 7 Similar data has been used by Manova and Zhang (2009) . One concern that inevitably arises with Chinese data is its quality. We checked the aggregate import and export values against those reported in the Comtrade data. The two datasets match remarkably well. Total exports in 2005 within the transactions data are $771.53 billion compared to $761.95 billion in Comtrade and at the HS2 level, the databases report similar values as well.
8 Speci…cally, we search for Chinese characters that mean "trading" and "importer" and "exporter". In pingyin (romanized Chinese), these phrases are: "jin4chu1kou3", "jing1mao4", "mao4yi4", "ke1mao4" and "wai4jing1". the second year after accession, the minimum capital requirement required for direct trading was RMB 3 million, and this fell to RMB 1 million by 2004. By 2005, any …rm that wished to directly trade with foreign partners was free to do so. As a result of this complication, our analysis uses a single cross-section of the data in 2005 when direct trading licenses had been e¤ectively removed.
Empirical Findings

Stylized Facts
We document a series of facts comparing the activity of intermediary and direct exporting …rms. The bottom panel of Table 1 reports the total number of …rms that export. This table also illustrates large increases in the number of globally engaged Chinese …rms during this period. Total exporting …rms more than doubled from approximately 63,000 …rms in 2000 to 144,000 by 2005. Interestingly, the growth in the number of intermediary …rms over this period exceeded the entry of direct exporters. This is suggestive evidence that despite the liberalization of direct trading rights, intermediary …rms found it pro…tably to enter the market. 9 Direct and intermediary …rms di¤er along several notable and important dimensions. Intermediaries are more likely to engage in both importing and exporting relative to their counterparts that directly trade (table not shown). Table 2 reports overall …rm-level summary statistics in 2005 in panel one, and statistics by …rm type in panels two and three. Again, we choose this year because direct trading licenses had been abolished by this year. As is well known in transactions data, a small number of exceptionally large …rms dominate trade statistics, and so we also report median statistics. Panel two shows that the median direct …rm exports 3 products to 3 destination markets. In contrast, the median intermediary exports 11 products to 6 countries. In row 4, we classify HS codes into one of 16 unrelated sectors. 10 The idea is to identify a …rm's core activity (e.g., animal products, wood products, textiles, etc.). Not surprisingly, the median direct …rm only exports products in one of these sectors. This is consistent with theoretical work in multiple-product …rm models (e.g., Eckel and Neary (2009) , Nocke and Yeaple (2006), or Bernard, Redding and Schott (2008) ) who introduce core competencies in a model of multiple-product …rms. Intermediary …rms, however, handle products that span entirely unrelated sectors; the median intermediary exports products in 4 sectors.
These statistics are broadly suggestive that intermediaries have a relative "country" focus-compared to direct …rms, they export more products per country. However, the …nal row of Table 2 reports that the average intermediary is larger than its direct exporting counterpart. It is therefore not surprising that the summary statistics indicate that traders export more products and to more destination markets. In order to verify if trading …rms have a relative country focus, we need to condition on …rm size. Column 1 of Table 3 report the average export varieties per country (column 1) by direct and intermediary …rms, conditional on a ‡exible quartic polynomial in …rm size (proxied by total export revenue). 11 The table shows that intermediary …rms average 10.5 varieties per country compared to direct …rms that export 8.3 varieties per country. In column 2, we include additional controls for ownership types and the results continue to hold-intermediary …rms export more varieties per country than direct …rms. These results are intuitive. Manufacturing …rms are likely to possess a core competent product, while the model suggests that the role of intermediaries is to facilitate access to markets.
An alternative way of understanding how the distribution of export sales over countries and products di¤er across …rm type is to consider the concentration of …rms'export sales by products. For each …rm, we compute its (normalized) her…ndahl index by aggregating over the country dimension. We can then compute the …rm's share of exports in each product, s hf , as:
where N f is the number of products that the …rm exports. A higher HI implies that a …rm's exports are more concentrated among its product mix. In column 3 of exporters, relative to intermediaries, have a relative "country" focus as their …rm sales are more heavily skewed towards a concentrated number of products. Thus, intermediaries appear to be relative "specialists" of countries rather than products. What types of products require intermediation? Figure 1 plots a histogram of the share of intermediary exports across the 5,034 HS6 codes. The histogram shows that virtually that intermediaries export virtually all products; thus, the overall numbers in Table 1 are not driven by certain sectors. The average intermediary share is 32.8% and only 6 percent of the HS6, or 302 codes, report intermediary shares of less than 1%. The two-digit HS sectors with the largest share of intermediary exports are: tobacco (HS 24, 99%), cereal (HS 10, 65%), ores (HS 26, 64%), live animals (HS 1, 63%) and explosives (HS 36, 56%). The …ve smallest are railway locomotives (HS 86, 3%), nickel (HS 75, 4%), nuclear reactors (HS 84, 9%) electrical machinery (HS 85, 9%) and semi-precious stones (HS 71, 11%). In Table  4 , we correlate HS6 shares of intermediary exports with measures of product di¤erentiation. Column 1 reports the correlation with the coe¢ cient of price variation. The result shows that products that are more homogenous tend to have larger intermediary shares. The point estimates imply that increasing the coe¢ cient of variation by one standard deviation lowers intermediary share by about 1.9 percentage points, or about 6 percent from the average share. In column 2, we report the correlation with the quality ladders proposed by Khandelwal (forthcoming) , and while the result is not statistically signi…cant, the correlation is consistent with column 1. Both measures suggest that intermediaries are more likely to handle relatively more homogenous, or "commoditized" products.
Our model predicts that the exports by intermediaries will be more expensive than direct exporters. This is because intermediation results in double marginalization and because …rms with relatively higher unit costs endogenously select the intermediation technology. We use use the unit value information in the data to provide some evidence that the data are consistent with these predictions. Table 5 compares unit values between …rm types. In this table, we regress (log) unit values on an intermediary dummy and country-HS8 product-ownership pair …xed e¤ects. We include ownership type in the …xed e¤ect because of evidence that foreign …rms charge higher prices relative to domestic …rms (Wang and Wei, 2008) . Consistent with the model, column 1 indicates that exports by intermediaries are about 3.6 percent higher than direct exporters. This estimate is likely to contain information on both the markup and the fact that intermediaries are predicted to handle products from less e¢ cient producers. While our model does not features heterogenous intermediary …rms, in column 2, we control for …rm which lowers the coe¢ cient to 2.5 percent. If one views the …rm size polynomials as controlling for the e¢ ciency of …rms, the estimate in column 2 could be a better measure of the average markup, although admittedly, this is quite crude. Nevertheless, the fact that intermediaries have higher unit values is consistent with the model's prediction. We note that this …nding also contrasts with the predictions of the model in Blum et al (2009) which does not imply double marginalization because the costs of using intermediation technology are all …xed. However, if unit values are a proxy for quality, this …nding could also be consistent with the quality-sorting role of intermediary …rms. For instance, Feenstra and Hanson (2004) have shown that re-exports of Chinese products by Hong Kong intermediaries have higher markups. In order to check against this alternative hypothesis, we interact the trader dummy with a product characteristics-the coe¢ cient of price variation or the quality ladder measure from Khandelwal (forthcoming)-that captures heterogeneity in the scope for quality di¤erentiation. If intermediaries mitigate adverse selection problems by acting as gauranteers of quality, we might expect their relative prices to increase in the scope for quality di¤erentiation. However, as shown in columns 3 and 4, the interaction coe¢ cient is not statistically di¤erent from zero. That is, the relative price di¤erence between intermediary and direct exporters is statistically equivalent across products that span a broad range of product heterogeneity. The …ndings suggest that quality sorting may not be the dominant role among Chinese intermediaries. In the next section, we o¤er evidence that consistent with our model, Chinese intermediaries arise because of trade costs.
Facilitating Trade
Figures 2 and 3 plot overall intermediary shares by destination market against the market's characteristics. Figure 2 shows a negative relationship between intermediary export shares and the destination's market 2005 GDP; exports to smaller markets are more likely to be handled by intermediaries. In Figure 3 , we average the share of intermediary exports by the number of documents required by the country's customs authorities (obtained from the World Bank's Doing Business Report). While admittedly crude, this variable, also used by Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) , potentially captures the …xed costs of exporting to a market. We see a strong positive relationship between intermediary export shares and the …xed cost of exports. The relationship in both …gures are consistent with predictions from the model.
In Table 6 , we more formally examine the main predictions of the model: the share of intermediary exports are increasing in the …xed and variable costs of exporting to markets. We construct the share of intermediary exports in country-HS6 observations and correlate the sahres with gravity-type proxies for trade costs. We use the following regression model
where s ch is the share of intermediary exports from China to country c in HS6 code h and the X's contain proxies for trade costs. In column 1, we regress country-HS6 intermediary share of exports on the distance to the country and the country's GDP. The coe¢ cient on distance is positive, a variable cost, and the coe¢ cient on GDP, a measure of market size, is negative. This is intuitive and accords with the model's predictions. Countries that are smaller and more distant rely relatively more on intermediaries for their imports from China. The results imply that doubling distance to China increases intermediary shares by 3.2 percentage points. Doubling market size results in a 2.2 percentage point decline in intermediary export shares. To get a sense of the magnitudes, the average HS6-level intermediary share is about 30 percent; thus, doubling distance to China increases intermediary shares to that country by about 10 percent. In column 2, we include the fraction of ethnic Chinese population with the country and …nd that intermediaries export relatively more to countries with fewer ethnic Chinese populations, although the coe¢ cient is not signi…cant at conventional levels. 12 This …nding is also intuitive: Chinese …rms will …nd it easier to export directly to countries with larger Chinese populations. This …nding is related to Rauch and Trindade (2004) who show that bilateral trade ‡ows are larger among countries with larger ethnic Chinese populations. Here, the results indicate that the share of exports through intermediaries is smaller in these countries. Presumably trade costs, which also encompass information barriers, are smaller between China and countries with a large number Chinese emigrants.
In column 3, we include the proxy for the …xed costs. The coe¢ cient on this variable is positive and statistically signi…cant suggesting that more di¢ cult to export markets are handled by relatively larger shares of intermediaries. The coe¢ cients on market size and distance are also robust. While our theoretical model provides an explanation for the endogenous entry of intermediary …rms, there may be other explainations for why intermediary …rms arise in equilibrium. For instance, if trade credit is scarce, intermediaries may export on behalf of …nancially constrained …rms. However, the results in Table 6 include HS6 …xed e¤ects and therefore control for product-level heterogeneity, such as di¤erences in …nancing requirements. Thus, our results suggest that market characteristics are salient determinants of intermediary export shares.
In column 4, we add the country's HS6-level MFN tari¤ rates as an additional variable cost proxy. According to the model, higher trade costs reduce the likelihood that less productive …rms can cover the …xed costs of exporting and therefore will indirectly export products. The correlation between intermediary shares and tari¤s is positive indicating that intermediaries are more important in country-product pairs with higher tari¤s. The magnitudes indicate that an 10 percentage point increase in tari¤s (roughly one standard deviation in our sample), holding other variables constant, would increase intermediary shares by .59 percentage points.
Our baseline results in Table 6 are consistent with the predictions from the model. We now assess the sensitivity of the results through a series of robustness checks in Table 7 . In column 1, we include country …xed e¤ects in the baseline regression. This speci…cation is therefore an extremely ‡exible speci…cation that controls for all country characteristic that were previously excluded in the baseline regressions, such as rule of law, level of …nancial development, etc. The regression identi…es the coe¢ cient on tari¤s using only cross-product variation within a country. Consistent with the predictions from the model, the coe¢ cient on tari¤s remains positive and marginally signi…cant (p-value is 11%), although not surprisingly, the magnitude attenuates.
Research on the nature of China's trade with Hong Kong has revealed that a large fraction of Hong Kong's exports originate from China, and these Hong Kong exporters are often intermediaries (Feenstra and Hanson, 2004) . So for Hong Kong in particular our classi…cation of intermediary trade may be imprecise. Moreoever, Fisman, Moustakerski and Wei (2008) present evidence that Hong Kong intermediaries that re-export Chinese are often used to evade tari¤s, and that tari¤ evasion increases with tari¤ rates. Thus, we may observe a correlation between tari¤ rates and intermediary exports due to the incentive to evade tari¤s. For these reasons, we introduce a sensitivity check that drops all exports to Hong Kong in column 2 of Table 7 . The results continue to hold.
In column 3, we remove exports transactions of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We exclude SOEs because the objective function of these …rms may not be consistent with the model's assumptions. The magnitude on distance attenuates somewhat but the qualitative estimate remains similar to the previous columns. The correlations with the other country characteristics remain statistically sign…cicant and have the same sign as earlier. Thus, these sensitivity checks are consistent with the view that intermediaries handle a relatively larger share of exports in more "di¢ cult-to-access" markets.
Finally, in column 4, we remove shipments that are classi…ed as processing and/or assembly trade. We remove these transactions because the …xed and variable trade costs for these shipments are likely to di¤er from ordinary exports. The coe¢ cients and patterns of signs remain as before.
Overall, the results identify stylized facts of intermediaries. First, although intermediaries span wide variety of products, conditional on size, intermediaries appear to adopt a relative country focus by having exports concentrated relatively within countries than within products. Second, intermediaries export varieties with higher unit values which is suggestive of the quality-sorting role of intermediaries. Finally, the aggregate shares indicate that intermediaries are more likely to export to "tougher" to access markets, where toughness is captured by measures …xed and variable costs. These results are consistent with the transaction costs role of intermediaries developed in the model.
Conclusion
This paper presents the …rst evidence of the role of intermediary …rms in facilitating trade across the full spectrum of exporting …rms in China. We …nd that non-manufacturing mediate a substantial fraction of …rm trade; in 2005, they mediated about 20% of China's aggregate trade. Intermediaries appear to adopt a relative country focus by having exports concentrated relatively within countries than within products. This "country"specialization is re ‡ected in aggregate statistics which suggest that intermediaries are more likely to export to "tougher" to access markets. This paper demonstrates that further research on intermediary exporting and importing …rms is warranted for several reasons. First, the recent literature on …rm heterogeneity within international trade has largely ignored the role of intermediaries. From a welfare perspective, the introduction of intermediaries within heterogenous …rm models can potentially alter the compositions of the gains from trade by placing a larger emphasis on varieties. Moreover, our model predicts that small …rms endogenously choose to export via intermediaries; this implies that small …rms can, and do, access foreign markets even though they are unable to cover the …xed costs of direct exporting. Thus, one implication of the model is that …rms can bene…t from importing products even if they do not directly import products. The presence of intermediaries implies that analyzing …rm-level imports may understate the bene…ts from importing that arise at the sector-level because of intermediaries (see Goldberg et al. 2009 ).
Intermediaries could therefore serve as vehicles for small …rms to learn their potential in foreign markets, either by learning about their own productivity, or about foreign demand. In subsequent periods, this may enable them to select directly in to the export market. Thus, the matching of …rms to intermediaries may be important for understanding the growth of the extensive margin of trade. It could also explain why countries enact policies to encourage the formation of intermediaries (e.g., Japan and the U.S.). We believe that the model presented in this paper, as well as the new stylized facts, could be useful to further research on intermediaries. Rubinstein, A. and A. Wolinsky (1987) . "Middlemen", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102: 581-593. Spulber, D. (1999) . Market microstructure: intermediaries and the theory of the …rm, Cambridge University Press.
A. Welfare Analysis: Two Country Case
In this section, we use a symmetric two-country model to investigate welfare in the presence of intermediation. In this two country model, we can re-write the indi¤erence conditions that de…ne the cuto¤s as
where F denotes the foreign market. In this case, we obtian a strict sorting condition with …rms that lie in the interval [' d ; ' i ) serve only the domestic market, …rms in [' i ; ' x ) incur the indirect …xed cost and use the intermediation technology and …rms with ' > ' x directly export to the foreign market. We can explictly derive expressions for the cuto¤ productivities:
We impose that f x > 1 f i so that more productive …rms choose to export directly their varieties.
The free entry condition requires that the present value of expected pro…t from entry must be equal to the entry cost, f e :
where d is the average pro…t across …rms from domestic market, i is the average pro…t from indirect exporting, and x is the average pro…t from direct exporting. i is the probability of indirect exporting, conditional on successful entry, and x is the probability of direct exporting, conditional on successful entry. It then follows that denotes the present value of average expected pro…t of …rms conditional on successful entry, while 1 G(' d ) is the probability of successful entry. In equilibrium, the goods market must be cleared in each country so that total expenditure is equal to total (domestic and foreign) …rm revenue. The assumption that countries are symmetric implies:
where M denotes the number of …rms in each country. The tilde denotes weighted averages of …rm productivities 13 and r(e ') denotes the average revenue of …rms within each group. We de…ne our welfare measure to be the country's real wage. When the nominal wage level is equalized across countries and normalized to one, the inverse of the price level is equivalent to real wage. The welfare level is then written from equation (14) as :
The expression for welfare in this model is identical to the welfare expression in Melitz (2003) . The only di¤erence is that the domestic cuto¤ level ' d in the intermediary model now also depends on . To evaluate the welfare impact of intermediaries, we simply need to compare the equilibrium domestic cuto¤ productivity level in our model to the cuto¤ in Melitz (2003) . We …rst rewrite free entry condition in equation (17) as:
Equations (20) and (16) jointly determine the the equilibrium domestic cuto¤ level. These two curves are illustrated in Figure 4 which shows that the free entry condition curve shifts upward and the cuto¤ condition curve rotates leftward in an economy with intermediaries (denoted by INT) compared to the Melitz economy (MTZ). 14 The …gure shows that the export cuto¤ in the 1 3 Speci…cally, we de…ne the weighted average productivities as e
for indirectly exported varieties, and
1 4 Free entry condition and cuto¤ condition in the Melitz (2003) model are given by fe
intermediary economy is always higher than in Melitz (2003) , but di¤erence between the domestic cuto¤s is ambiguous. It is therefore di¢ cult to predict the welfare impact of an economy with intertermediation technology in the general case. The presence of intermediaries generates a tradeo¤ between e¢ ciency loss in resource reallocation and variety gains; intermediaries enable less productive …rms to access foreign markets, resulting in gains from variety, but this leads to a less e¢ cient allocation of resources across manufacturers. In the case that productivity is distributed Pareto, we can unambiguously compare the two models. We assume G(') = 1 b ' k , where k > 1; and the density function is given by g(') = kb k ' k 1 : Under this assumption, the equilibrium domestic cuto¤ level is obtained from free entry condition in equation (20) and the cuto¤ conditions, equation (15) and (16). Since
free entry condition becomes:
1 such that ' x = ' i ; no …rms choose to export indirectly and the model collapses to standard Melitz model. As decreases from this level, the term F increases Table regresses intermediary share of exports at the HS6 level on the HS6 coefficient of price variation (column 1) and the HS6-level quality ladder (column 2) taken from Khandelwal (forthcoming) . The loss of observations in column 2 is due to the fact that the quality ladder is not available for all HS6 codes. Significance: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent. The dependent variable in each regression is the share of intermediary exports of total country-HS6 exports. Column 1 includes distance and market size as covariates. Column 2 adds the share of ethnic Chinese population, taken from Ohio University Shao Center's Distribution of the Ethnic Chinese Population Around the World. Column 3 includes the World Bank's Doing Business Report measure of the number of procedures required for importing a container. Column 4 includes the country's HS6 MFN tariff on Chinese products, obtained from WITS. All standard errors clustered at the country level. Significance: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent.
Intermediary Share of Exports and Product Characteristics
Intermediary Export Share and Country Characteristics Intermediary Export Share and Country Characteristics Notes: The dependent variable in each regression is the share of intermediary exports of total country-HS6 exports. Column 2 excludes exports to Hong Kong. Column 3 excludes exports by state-owned enterprises and re-computes intermediary shares of country-HS6 exports. Column 4 removes all exports classified under processing and assembly trade and recomputes intermediary shares of country-HS6 exports. All standard errors clustered at the country level. Significance: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent. Melitz (2003) 
